So let me take on the burden of stupid here: how are a password hash and a string-based KDF different? (I mean, the oldest well-known example of the former literally calls itself a PBKDF.) I understand this particular function from strings to large fixed numbers was limited in the length of the string it would accept, and I agree that’s a problem, but it feels like a problem orthogonal to the distinction you’re drawing.
There is a huge amount of overlap, in that most modern password hashes can be used and are sort of fundamentally based on the idea of a string KDF. The big differences are, as you can see here, that a string or password KDF will take an arbitrarily long string, and that a KDF produces some specific raw random output, and a password hash produces a verifier string (the raw random hash, plus usually some metadata encoded some way; for bcrypt, that's the algorithm and cost and salt, for instance).
A potential distinction is entropy preservation. For password hashes you usually want to preserve as much entropy as possible although one could argue that beyond 256 bits of output it may not matter (only one-time pads would suffer from smaller output). KDFs on the other hand must output a correctly-sized key for a particular cipher and so have further constraints on output choices (and potentially avoiding weak keys, e.g. for elliptic curve point generation).
Password hash functions are designed to be slow, are designed to be use with salts, and may have low entropy inputs. Being slow is a waste for (true) KDFs, salts aren't relevant (although nonces may be), and are designed for high entropy inputs.
The naming overlap between the two is bad, so the industry has tried to move towards naming the two differently. Password hashing functions are not ideal KDFs, even though a particular primitive may be secure for use as a KDF. That's a root of some of the confusion.
Password hash functions are intentionally designed to be extremely slow (at an exponential scale). While this makes perfect sense for password hashing, it is nonsensical to have such an intentional, configurable slowdown mechanism in KDFs. KDFs have computational cost, but having the kind of extreme slowdown that password hash functions have makes no sense for purpose designed KDFs, especially when needing to derive many keys.
