> To those saying RIP, Telegram will succeed. Without using it (I use a Blackberry), it looks to be top two of the chat apps when you combine usability/security. I will download it once I get an Android phone in January.
But it is not secure! That's the entire point.
Never mind "not secure against a well funded government agency", it's not secure against other attackers.
There are lots of usable chat apps that do not give you the illusion of security.
> and not looking to takeout anyone who has a different approach.
You seem to be mistaken about why they do this. It's nothing to do with pushing their app or their approach. They'd welcome good well-formed apps to compete with them. But when they see an app that claims to be secure they have an ethical duty to let people know if it is obviously not secure.
Most people are not bashing just for the sake of bashing. Some people need good cryptography software to avoid imprisonment, or torture, or state-killing. This isn't about stopping someone's teen-angsty poetry from being discovered by a sibling, it's about protecting political dissidents from an oppressive regime. In that context pointing out that a software is broken is not mindless bashing, it is a crucial part of the cryptography process.
(I'll accept that a few people are missing the mark with their criticisms.)
Pointing out flawed crypto software is part of a long tradition going back many years. It's part of the culture. Most cryptographer will start by analysing other software and finding flaws before implementing their own software.
Most people are not bashing just for the sake of bashing. Some people need good cryptography software to avoid imprisonment, or torture, or state-killing. This isn't about stopping someone's teen-angsty poetry from being discovered by a sibling, it's about protecting political dissidents from an oppressive regime. In that context pointing out that a software is broken is not mindless bashing, it is a crucial part of the cryptography process.
I like your commentary it is level headed and explains the position of the non biased "other side".
I think the conflicted position of the lead bashers did not help their position. It would have been much more useful for a neutral party to do a comparative analysis and stated the pros and cons of each side.
As for me and most normal users, the security we need is not from NSA type of snooping but from mid level risks. There may be some sacrifices that may have to be made. Just like the position Ubuntu plays where Linux distros are concerned
For people like Snowden, Greenwald and others with NSA level adversaries, I do not expect them to rely on any third party application at all.
Now your argument may be that they have created stuff for sexting teens and claimed to be good enough for Snowden. In that case, I would argue that it could have been pointed out that in a different and perhaps more polite way.
I would worry about anyone who has created any crypto tool who is not over confident in his product. I will also expect the person to be receptive to constructive feedback NOT "leave your product and join us" or "This is shit because no noted crypto person is on your team"
I remember when cperciva that built Tarsnap, an online "backup for paranoid users" launched, he was rather confident in his product and I did not see any intense bashing of him. As expected,there have been bugs in his system and he has fixed them as they have arisen.
We should help things grow right here on HN not hope for things to fail if they do not support the view of the crowd.
> It would have been much more useful for a neutral party to do a comparative analysis and stated the pros and cons of each side.
And what would this neutral party be?
> As for me and most normal users, the security we need is not from NSA type of snooping but from mid level risks. There may be some sacrifices that may have to be made. Just like the position Ubuntu plays where Linux distros are concerned
You make it sound as if having government-grade encryption was very hard or very costly but that's obviously not the case, there are many open encryption standard who wouldn't have had the kind of issues Telegram has. Do you want to start a new contest targeting a properly configured openSSH for instance? There is no need for tradeoff there.
> I remember when cperciva that built Tarsnap, an online "backup for paranoid users" launched, he was rather confident in his product and I did not see any intense bashing of him. As expected,there have been bugs in his system and he has fixed them as they have arisen.
Colin Percival has credentials and experience in the cryptoworld. When he makes "new" crypto like scrypt he publishes it and it's been thoroughly reviewed. It also has distinct advantages over previous technologies, it's not just new for the sake of being new.
Crypto is serious business, people can get hurt. Toying with crypto, proposing new ideas is of course to be encouraged, but be humble about it and listen to the feedback. Actually, this last part is true for everything.
> Colin Percival has credentials and experience in the cryptoworld. When he makes "new" crypto like scrypt he publishes it and it's been thoroughly reviewed. It also has distinct advantages over previous technologies, it's not just new for the sake of being new.
He also, AFAICR, did not appear over confident, he was clear in delineating what his application does and does not protect against, and what his goals are (that is one reason why he deserves these crypto credentials).
He published his entire source code.
And when he launched a contest, it was in the form of a bug bounty, he accepted any kind of bugs (up to and including spelling errors in his code comments :) ).
Completely disagree. It was just a week or two before Snowden came out that New York Times was praising Skype for how "secure" it is, even against government snooping. The poor souls thought Skype was still P2P, when that stopped being true many years before. The NYT journalists were also probably using Skype to talk to their sources, thinking they are secure. That's why it's so important to have such reviews of these apps - especially if they're a more "mainstream app", and there's a potential for hundreds of millions of people to use it. If we can get hundreds of millions of people to use end-to-end encrypted communication, why not do it properly, and give them half-baked secure apps to use instead?
Also all "secure apps" that aren't fully open source should be considered insecure by default. No compromises. Whatsapp, Snapchat, Hangouts, Skype, they're all insecure and you can't rely on them for keeping your communications private.
It would have been much more useful for a neutral party to do a comparative analysis and stated the pros and cons of each side.
Like, say, tptacek, who is not in the "instant messenger" business, who is in the security audit business, and whose comments here on the technical details of the Telegram protocol have been absolutely damning? See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6941934 for example.
I wholeheartedly disagree. For any user, the security we need is prevent eavesdropping & data mining by our governments. They use it to profile us, to find thoughtcrime and to secure their standing in a surveillance society. We should not let that happen.
Do you live or work in a building that has windows on the ground floor?
Who made your doors? What specification were your doors built to? Who made your door locks? What specification were they built to? Who has authority to cut keys to those locks? How do you know?
If you truly are as worried by governments as you claim why are you not fortifying your home?
Using good crypto is fortifying your home. People could easily learn information that could help them secretly enter my home if they could monitor my communications.
> As for me and most normal users, the security we need is not from NSA type of snooping but from mid level risks.
Most users, disregarding the government for the moment, don't need encryption full stop. They don't send anything commercially sensitive that an attacker's going to be interested enough in to try to intercept their messages.
The use of encryption presupposes a motivated threat, and it's not clear to me that the NSA is significantly more powerful than other adversaries in that area. They've more computing power, more political power, they can buy zero day exploits. They probably even have some very smart people, who can find flaws faster than the attackers in civ-space. But speed isn't required, only persistence; motivation, interest. Which is, after all, what we're supposing in the first place if someone's going to go to the trouble of intercepting your messages.
It's not clear to me that unless your goal is 'make something that the NSA can't break into', you're going to make something that a well motivated attacker can't break into either. And this stuff only has to be broken once, then they'll just sell or share the attack. The conflict is asymmetrical.
Your argument seems to be posited on the idea that there will be no attacker; no-one anywhere, ever; sufficiently motivated to breach the protocol. And I find that highly questionable, given that a flaw has already been found - and with far lower levels of incentive than will be present if the system is widely deployed and used to protect valuable information.
> Most users, disregarding the government for the moment, don't need encryption full stop.
You've no idea what you're talking about. Please stop spreading such bullshit around; other people might fall for it!
Fireship is an app that allows you to hijack the account of any user on the same Wi-Fi network as you are, if the network is not encrypted, and the user used a non-encrypted connection to the website. Facebook, Google, Twitter and Flicker were all susceptible to such attacks before the advent of this tool; afterwards, they fixed it by using https by default.
Do you want random strangers to have full access to your Facebook account? No? Then you should realize that most people do need encryption full stop.
Also, only very powerful attackers can hack https encryption (they need either access to your laptop (hardware access, or a zero-day exploit), or access to the website (e.g. court warrant, or coercing a certificate authority)).
We were having a discussion about Telegram and similar uses of encryption, a discussion where I specifically responded to a remark on the strength required of Telegram-style encryption. I would hope that most people are capable of interpreting the context of a remark - especially embedded in paragraphs that expand on it. Rather than, 'fall[ing] for it!'
-sigh-
Beyond that I'm not going to engage with you any further, on this or any other point. You strike me as a bully, restrained where you are simply by the absence of an excuse rather than the presence of decency. As such, I've no interest in associating with you.
But it is not secure! That's the entire point.
Never mind "not secure against a well funded government agency", it's not secure against other attackers.
There are lots of usable chat apps that do not give you the illusion of security.
> and not looking to takeout anyone who has a different approach.
You seem to be mistaken about why they do this. It's nothing to do with pushing their app or their approach. They'd welcome good well-formed apps to compete with them. But when they see an app that claims to be secure they have an ethical duty to let people know if it is obviously not secure.
Most people are not bashing just for the sake of bashing. Some people need good cryptography software to avoid imprisonment, or torture, or state-killing. This isn't about stopping someone's teen-angsty poetry from being discovered by a sibling, it's about protecting political dissidents from an oppressive regime. In that context pointing out that a software is broken is not mindless bashing, it is a crucial part of the cryptography process.
(I'll accept that a few people are missing the mark with their criticisms.)
Pointing out flawed crypto software is part of a long tradition going back many years. It's part of the culture. Most cryptographer will start by analysing other software and finding flaws before implementing their own software.